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TeamPCP Linked To Redis Attacks Dating Back To 2020 And Later Supply Chain Campaign
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- DeepHorus
New analysis from Oligo Security reveals that the threat actor known as TeamPCP has been active since at least 2020, long before its recent high-profile software supply chain attacks. Researchers Avi Lumelsky and Gal Elbaz say the group has been compromising internet-facing infrastructure for years, with overlapping domains, malware staging techniques, backend infrastructure, and operational tradecraft tying earlier campaigns together.
The findings connect two distinct campaigns observed in the second half of 2025: ShadowRay 2.0 (also called IronErn), which hijacked AI infrastructure into a self-propagating botnet, and TA-NATALSTATUS, which exploited exposed Redis servers to deliver cryptocurrency miners. Oligo assesses that TA-NATALSTATUS evolved from a campaign documented by Trend Micro in April 2020, indicating the threat actor targeted Ray, Docker, Redis, and React well before adopting the TeamPCP name.
TeamPCP first came to light late last year, linked to exploitation of flaws in React Server Components and Next.js to steal credentials and sensitive data in an operation called PCPcat. Earlier this year, Flare described a massive campaign where the group systematically targeted cloud native environments, building distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure at scale before moving to data exfiltration, ransomware, extortion, and cryptocurrency mining.
Oligo found a direct operational bridge between ShadowRay 2.0 and TeamPCP by correlating GitLab authentication logs, command-and-control infrastructure, reverse-shell activity, and malware staging. The group repeatedly abused known security flaws in React, Docker, Redis, and Ray, relying on automated, wormable exploitation techniques for self-propagation. More recently, they poisoned popular open-source libraries using GitHub Actions and token theft to infect developer systems en masse.
The shift into cascading supply chain attacks represents a natural evolution, letting the actors exploit legitimate cloud infrastructure and repurpose proven methods. Their malware arsenal continues to evolve, including a Python script called kube.py used after breaching Kubernetes environments. Early versions focused on propagation and persistence, but variants observed as recently as March 2026 add wiper functionality.
This destructive code checks whether the victim system uses the Iran timezone; if so, it launches a DaemonSet that wipes every cluster node using a wiper named Kamikaze. On Kubernetes nodes outside Iran, it deploys the CanisterWorm backdoor, while non-Kubernetes Iranian systems get a poison_pill() routine that erases the entire filesystem.
Oligo researchers emphasize that these linked operations show a threat actor that has continuously adapted and broadened its scope. The company warns that the group's ability to move from opportunistic server compromises to sophisticated supply chain attacks makes it a significant and persistent danger. Observers expect TeamPCP to keep refining its techniques, particularly around AI infrastructure and developer ecosystems, as those become even more central to modern software development.
